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Abstract
This article chronicles more than 30 years of public opinion, politics, and law and policy on privacy
and confidentiality that have had far-reaching consequences for access by the social research
community to administrative and statistical records produced by government. A hostile political
environment, public controversy over the decennial census long form, media coverage, and public
fears about the vast accumulations of personal information by the private sector were catalysts for a
recent proposal by the U.S. Bureau of the Census that would have significantly altered the contents of
the 2000 census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). These events show clearly that science does
not operate independently from the political sphere but may be transformed by a political world where
powerful interests lead government agencies to assume responsibility for privacy protection that can
result in reducing access to statistical data. D 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Personal privacy; Confidentiality; Information privacy; Data access; Data sharing; Decennial census;
PUMS, Public use microdata sample
1. Introduction
More than 30 years of public opinion polls record significant concerns about the quantity
and use of personal information collected by the US government and private sector and
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computer technology whose uses are perceived to diminish personal privacy. During the
1970s, public anxiety was a catalyst for legislative hearings, the enactment of federal and
state statutes, and implementation of administrative policies, regulations, and guidelines to
safeguard privacy and create enforceable expectations of confidentiality for personal
information that was collected by government, financial institutions, and the social research
community1. Access to government records became restricted. Research on statistical
methods to limit disclosure risk made it possible, however, to distribute public use files
and summary data tabulations that both protected the confidentiality of respondent informa-
tion and ensured access to data as a necessary component of scientific discovery and for
informed public policy decisions.
The highly charged discourse about public policy and private lives escalated throughout
the 1990s, as the government and the private sector collected more personal information and
as computer technology moved from the workplace to the home and people connected to the
Internet. The mass media trumpeted failures of data security and e-commerce firms’ sale of
personal information. Public concerns resonated with legislators and government admin-
istrators, and they responded with hundreds of bills to protect medical records and financial
information, limit the exchange or sale of personal information, and protect the privacy of
e-mail communication and a host of other privacy-related issues. Competing interests
mobilized as privacy advocates lobbied for greater safeguards and government intervention,
while business interest groups opposed government regulation. Just as earlier debates about
government intrusion into personal lives had activated the public during the 1970s and
changed social scientists’ relationship with government, the debates about Internet data
security and personal information as big business heightened the sensitivity of government
agencies charged with funding research and the social science community that depended on
government data.
This article chronicles how public opinion, politics, and law and policy relating to
privacy and confidentiality have impacted the social research community’s access to
government administrative and statistical records. A U.S. Census Bureau proposal for
releasing the 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) illustrates how science is not
an activity that operates independently from the political sphere. The first part of the
article summarizes more than 30 years of public opinion on personal privacy and its
relationship to computer technology. The second part discusses how federal and state
statutes designed to safeguard personal information collected by government agencies
transformed social science’s relationship with government since the 1970s. Part 3 is a
case study of the public controversy over the decennial census long form. It shows how a
hostile political environment, media coverage, and public fears about vast accumulations
of personal information led to a U.S. Census Bureau proposal that would significantly
alter the contents of the 2000 census PUMS. Part 4 places the Bureau’s proposal in the
context of congressional inaction, modified institutional relationships, and powerful
interests that led government agencies to assume responsibility for privacy protection.
The article concludes that it is likely that government agencies will decrease access to
statistical data in a response to a political environment perceived to threaten the viability
of basic government functions.
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2. Public opinion surveys on personal privacy, assurances of confidentiality, and the role
of computer technology, 1968–2000
Although the word ‘‘privacy’’ does not appear in the US Constitution, public opinion
surveys show that most Americans believe that personal privacy is ‘‘one of the key things in
making this country work, in making this country what it is today,’’ and that privacy is a
‘‘right’’ equal to ‘‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’’.2 More than 30 years of public
opinion polling shows that privacy is deeply rooted in the American psyche. These surveys
record a significant increase in concerns about intrusions into personal life, the quantity and
use of personal information collected by government and the private sector, and computer
technology uses perceived to threaten personal privacy.3 The next five sections trace the
escalating concerns about privacy since the late 1960s as reflected in public opinion polls
conducted by major polling agencies, violations of personal privacy that respondents have
experienced, the role that computer technology has played to increase concerns about
adequate privacy protection, confidence in assurances of privacy made by business, and
confidence in government data collection and record-keeping.
2.1. Escalating concerns about personal privacy
The Louis Harris and Associates polling firm first recorded Americans’ general
concerns about privacy in March 1968 (Harris Poll #1815). Respondents were asked,
‘‘Do you ever tend to feel that sometimes your sense of privacy is being invaded or not—
that people are trying to find out things about you that are not any of their business?’’
Sixty-two percent of the respondents stated that they did not believe that their privacy was
being invaded. By the mid-1970s, however, the Watergate Affair and the Nixon Admin-
istration’s highly publicized wiretapping and surveillance activities radically altered
Americans’ assessment of the importance of personal privacy. Between March 1974 and
April 1978, Americans became very concerned about privacy in their personal life, with
between 90% and 97% in March 1974 (Harris Poll #7481) and June 1976 (Harris Poll
#7684), respectively, rating privacy as ‘‘very important’’ in their personal life. However,
by April 1978 (Harris Poll #7804), the percentage of respondents who ranked privacy as
‘‘very important’’ declined to 79%.4
Louis Harris and Associates modified their question wording during the late 1970s to ask
respondents about their ‘‘level of concern’’ about ‘‘threats of personal privacy in America
today.’’ Table 1 shows substantial increases between November 1978 and June 1998 in the
number of respondents who said they were ‘‘very concerned,’’ from 31% to 52%, with a large
jump registered between 1978 and 1983 (31–43%).5 Overall, the number of people who
registered ‘‘very concerned’’ and ‘‘somewhat concerned’’ about personal privacy grew from
63% in 1968 to nearly 90% in 1998. The 20 years of polling data also show a corresponding
significant decline in the ‘‘not very concerned’’ and ‘‘not concerned at all,’’ from 36% to 8%.
A June 1992 Harris survey found that 66% agreed with the statement that ‘‘Personal
privacy was not adequately safeguarded’’ (Harris Poll #924010). Six years later, in June
and July 1998, surveys found that about 60% of the respondents were not convinced that
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their ‘‘rights to privacy as a consumer were adequately protected by law or business
practice’’ and more than 44% of respondents believed that consumer privacy protection
would get worse or that the situation would remain unchanged (39%) (Harris Polls
#738366 and #638114).
2.2. Threats to and actual invasions of personal privacy
During the 1960s and 1970s, Louis Harris and Associates followed this question about
‘‘concern about privacy’’ with a series of questions about particular threats to personal
privacy, actual experience, and the source of the threat. Variations on these questions were
later asked in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000. Early surveys conducted between 1968 and
1976 identified threats coming from family members, neighbors, employees, business, survey
polling agencies, telephone company, government, and the computer (Harris Polls #1815,
#7481, and #7680). Over this 8-year period, surveys found an increase in the amount of
information about personal finances, the number of overheard personal conversations, and
close supervision of employees. A series of surveys conducted between March 1974 and
1977, in June 1995, and again in December 1999 found high levels of concern about hospitals
and insurance companies’ use of medical records and credit bureaus, credit card companies,
banks, and government agencies’ collection of financial information (Harris Polls #7481,
#7483, #7690, #953012, and #11581). A November 1999 Harris survey found an increase in
the number of respondents who said that inaccurate information had prevented them from
obtaining employment, insurance, and credit (Harris Poll #11490).
Table 1
Importance of personal privacy, November 1978–June 1998
How concerned are you
about threats to your personal













Nov 1978 (Harris #S2826; N= 1511) 31.0 32.5 17.2 18.7
Sep 1983 (Harris #832033; N= 1256)a 47.3 29.91 15.1 7.5
Jan 1990 (Harris #892049; N = 2254) 43.7 35.3 14.6 5.9
Jun 1991 (Harris #912046; N = 1255) 48.4 31.0 12.0 7.2
Jun 1992 (Harris #924010; N = 1254) 47.0 30.7 12.9 7.7
Mar 1992 (Harris #92300; N = 1000) 41.1 37.9 16.0 5.0
May 1993 (Harris #931103; N= 1252) 56.7 28.1 10.0 4.8
Jul 1993 (Harris #931104; N= 1253) 50.0 31.3 11.5 6.0
Jul 1993 (Harris #934009; N= 1000) 49.3 30.3 11.5 6.1
Jun 1994 (Harris #943007; N = 1000) 48.9 32.8 12.1 5.3
Aug 1994 (Harris #943014; N= 1005) 50.8 32.6 10.4 5.3
Jun 1995 (Harris #953012; N = 1006) 46.7 34.8 11.5 5.8
Jun 1998 (Harris #738366; N = 1512) 52.2 34.9 9.7 3.1
Source: Louis Harris’ surveys of national probability samples of adults 18 or 21 years or older, available at http://
www.irss.unc.edu (June 9, 2000).
a The question was slightly modified by the addition of an introductory sentence: Question: 9a ‘‘Now, let me
ask you about technology and privacy.’’
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Over the past three decades, between 20% and 25% of the respondents have experienced
some form of privacy invasion, most likely at the hands of a credit bureau, a government
agency, or an individual. This percentage remained unchanged during the late 1990s,
increased slightly in early 2000 to 27%, but declined to 15% in late 2000 (Harris Polls
#818399, #12059, and #12963). Of those who reported an invasion of privacy in April
1997, more than 13% named government, 43% accused a business, 29.4% named an
individual, and 12.5% mentioned ‘‘some other source’’ as responsible (Harris Poll
#638114). Five percent of the respondents in the April 1997 survey who were computer
users indicated that ‘‘their privacy had been invaded when using the Internet’’ and nearly
8% of them named their online service provider as responsible. A year later, in June 1998,
40% of the sample identified themselves as victims of an ‘‘improper invasion of privacy by
a business’’ (Harris Poll #738366).
2.3. Personal privacy, computer technology, and the Internet
Given the recognition of the utility of computers as well as great concern about their
potential to diminish personal privacy, it is important to contextualize the trepidation about
computer technology. The Louis Harris and Associates polling agency asked a series of
questions between 1974 and 1977 that clearly showed Americans believing that the computer
provided significant benefits for health, education, safety, and law enforcement (between 84%
and 92%) (Harris Polls #7483, #7687, and #7690). From the mid-1970s to 1990, surveys
showed that the majority of Americans supported, often by large margins, intrusions into
privacy for national security matters, drug testing of employees in critical occupations,
corruption, listening in on telephone conversations to monitor worker productivity and
quality, and identifying drug smugglers and people with AIDS (Harris Polls #7483, #9119,
#874014, #874016, and #892049).6 A recent survey conducted in 2000 found that more than
90% of the respondents approved of the sharing of corporate-held personal information with
law enforcement agencies that ‘‘pertained to fraud, conviction records, and other misconduct’’
(McGuire, 2000a). More generally, public opinion surveys have consistently recorded high
levels of enthusiasm for computers, with 71% of the public indicating that the new
communication technologies have improved the quality of life, according to a recent Pew
Research Center (1999) survey.
Nonetheless, there has been a significant increase in anxiety associated with the computer,
even as the majority of Americans have become users of the technology (U.S. National
Technical Information Administration, 2000). Nonusers are, however, consistently more
anxious than users about computer-related risks to personal privacy. Table 2 records public
concern about the computer as a threat to privacy between 1968 and 1992.
Perceptions of computer-based privacy violations rose between March 1968 and January
1976 from 18% to about 54%. From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, Harris found that
between 38% and 69% of the respondents agreed that computers posed a threat to personal
privacy (Louis Harris and Associates, 1984; Louis Harris and Associates & Westin, 1979). In
1983, respondents agreed by large majorities that ‘‘information in computers [is] not
adequately safeguarded’’ (60%), a ‘‘master file on [yourself]’’ constituted a violation of
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Table 2











































Do you ever feel your privacy
is being violated by computers,
which collect and store a lot
of information about youd?
18.5 72.0 34.0 57.8 39.7 53.9
Do you feel that the present uses
of computers are an actual
threat to personal privacy in
this country or not?
38.0 41.4 37.0 50.9 54.5 31.2 70.0 26.6 68.6 28.8
Source: Louis Harris’ surveys of national probability samples of adults 18 or 21 years or older, available at http://www.irss.unc.edu (June 9, 2000).
a Responses: ‘‘An actual threat to personal privacy’’ (Yes), ‘‘Not an actual threat to personal privacy’’ (No), and Not sure (not included in table).
b The question reads: ‘‘The following statements are concerned with the development of information-processing systems such as computers and word
processors. Tell me if you mostly agree or mostly disagree with each of these statements. Item: It will be increasingly possible to use computer data banks to
infringe upon personal privacy:’’ Responses: Mostly agree/Mostly disagree/No opinion (Vol.)/Not sure. ‘‘Mostly agree’’ is ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘Mostly disagree’’ is
‘‘No.’’
c Wording of question was changed to ‘‘Agree very strongly/Agree somewhat strongly/Disagree somewhat strongly/Disagree very strongly/Not sure.’’
‘‘Yes’’ represents collapsing of ‘‘Agree very strongly’’ and ‘‘Agree somewhat strongly’’ and ‘‘No’’ represents ‘‘Disagree somewhat strongly’’ and ‘‘Disagree
very strongly.’’
d Wording of introduction slightly altered in March 1974 and January 1976 questions: ‘‘Have you ever felt that (read first item on list) infringed on your













































privacy (79%), and ‘‘the use of computers had to be sharply restricted in the future in order to
preserve privacy’’ (65%) (Harris Poll #8333). By 1985, 70% of Americans agreed with the
statement that, ‘‘It will be increasingly possible to use computer databanks to infringe upon
personal privacy’’ (Harris Poll #851204). In 1998, a Harris poll found in a national survey
that 88% of respondents who were computer users (n = 459) were ‘‘very concerned’’ or
‘‘somewhat concerned’’ that the ‘‘content of what [was] communicated by e-mail or
electronic mail through the Internet would be read by some other person or organization
without [their] knowledge or consent’’ (Harris Poll #818399).
Two years later, a University of California at Los Angeles, Center for Communication
Policy (2000) survey of Internet and non-Internet users found additional evidence of public
perceptions of the Internet and its relationship to personal privacy. The Center’s report noted
that, ‘‘Privacy has emerged as the subject that raises the greatest concern about the Internet
among both users and nonusers’’ ( p. 32). Nearly two-thirds of the Internet users and more
than three-quarters of the nonusers agreed with the statement that, ‘‘People who go online put
their privacy at risk’’ ( p. 32).
2.4. Lack of confidence in business
Business practices regarding personal data appear primarily responsible for people’s
privacy concerns. Opinion surveys show that consumers do not trust businesses’ assurances
of privacy. Although consumers say that Web site privacy policies matter, polls show that
they have little confidence in companies that provide guarantees of privacy of personal
information. For example, a March 2000 survey found that only 10% of the sample
maintained that they trusted business ‘‘completely,’’ whereas 66% said they trusted business
‘‘somewhat’’ and 24% ‘‘not at all’’ (Harris Poll #12069). However, more than 75% say they
would be more likely to use the Internet if the privacy of personal information and
communications would be protected (Harris Polls #738226 and #818399).
A 1998 survey of FamilyPC magazine subscribers, conducted by researchers at AT&T
Laboratories, supports findings from the Harris surveys of the general public, with more
detailed information about the concerns of ‘‘heavy’’ Internet users (Crano, Reagle, &
Ackerman, 2000). Respondents were ‘‘generally comfortable providing preference informa-
tion to Web companies’’ but were ‘‘often very uncomfortable providing credit card, social
security, and telephone numbers’’ and much less sensitive about providing e-mail addresses.
While the ‘‘most important factor’’ in releasing personal information was whether that
information would be ‘‘shared with other companies and organizations,’’ the willingness to
provide personal information depended heavily on how it would be used. Respondents
wanted legal protection for using the ‘‘information for any purpose other than processing the
request,’’ an enforceable company privacy policy, and a seal of approval for the Web
company ‘‘from a well-known organization such as the Better Business Bureau.’’
Nonetheless, there is ambivalence about whether business should monitor itself or be
regulated by government in order to assure the protection of personal information. A Harris
survey conducted in February 1998 asked respondents their opinion on ‘‘ways that the
government could approach Internet privacy issues. . .at this stage of Internet development’’
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(Harris Poll #818399). Slightly more than 50% of the respondents said that government
should pass laws ‘‘now for how personal information can be collected and used on the
Internet.’’ Two years later, in March 2000, the percentage of respondents who believed that
government ‘‘should pass laws now’’ increased to 57.4% (Harris Poll #12059). Preliminary
findings from focus group research, conducted with the sponsorship of the Markle
Foundation during 2000, reinforced this apparent ambivalence (Clausing, 2000a). On the
one hand, the participants ‘‘seemed to trust business over government to regulate the
Internet’’ and ‘‘absolutely wanted no government involvement.’’ However, ‘‘on privacy
and fraud, they echoed the call of buyer beware’’ and also ‘‘seemed to expect some type of
rules or protections’’ enforced by government. The responses clearly underscore the
ambivalence that people have about the role of government.
2.5. Trust in government: data collection and record-keeping
Evidence of declining levels of trust in government concerning assurances of confidenti-
ality were recorded between 1968 and 1976 in a series of questions about whether the
Census Bureau, Internal Revenue Service, and Social Security Administration would protect
personal information (Harris Polls #1815, #7483, and #7680). Although a large majority
believed government assurances that their information was secure, the percentage of
respondents who did not believe their personal information would be protected grew from
17% to 26% for tax information, from 13% to 15% for census information, and from 7% to
13% for earnings information.
Further declines in trust in government were recorded during the 1980s until mid-2000.
When asked, in September 1983, if ‘‘a government in Washington will use confidential
information to intimidate individuals or groups it feels are its enemies,’’ more than 85% of the
leaders and general public responded positively (Harris Poll #832033). Government databases
posed a ‘‘very serious’’ or ‘‘fairly serious’’ threat to individual privacy for a majority of
respondents (56%) in 1985, and this threat climbed to 78% in 1996 according to the National
Opinion Research Center (1996) surveys.7 A Pew Research Center (2000) survey on trust in
government conducted in July 2000 shows a precipitous decline in the level of confidence
that personal information will remain confidential even with government assurances. The
survey found that only 40% of those surveyed said they could trust their government ‘‘at least
most of the time.’’
An April 1997 Harris survey found that 75% of respondents who were computer users
opposed local and state governments ‘‘putting public records, including real estate, court,
and license information, onto the Internet, for easier access by all interested parties’’ (Harris
Poll #738226). Three years later, in 2000, a study directed by Alan Westin, ‘‘Public Records
and the Responsible Use of Information,’’ found that 84% of respondents ‘‘said that
government agencies should not be able to display even public records of personal
information over the Internet’’ (McGuire, 2000a). At the same time, however, concern
about misuse of their personal information was balanced by more than 60% of these same
respondents who would be ‘‘comfortable with allowing agencies to post public records if the
agencies in question adhered to certain privacy guidelines’’ and the ‘‘nearly 70% of them
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who would permit the posting if the agencies in question sought permission from individuals
before the fact.’’
2.6. Summary
Overall, public opinion surveys over more than 30 years show that beliefs about the loss of
personal privacy are associated with the quantity of personal information collected by
government and the private sector. Computer technology has reinforced the anxiety. Recent
increases in concern about personal privacy can be traced to the developments in e-commerce
and matters related to consumer protection and are also associated with the sale of personal
information, identity theft, and breaches of security in database systems. Americans lack
confidence in business practices. People believe that their personal information can be
misused or abused and easily exchanged via computer and that they cannot trust the
government or the private sector to safeguard their personal information. They support
stronger privacy protections for personal information held by the private sector but remain
ambivalent about whether government should regulate the private sector.
Public attitudes towards government have had indirect but cumulative effects on support
for government record keeping. These attitudes sensitized government agencies to external
threats to the social science enterprise might pose and subsequently affected access by the
social science community.
3. Transformation of government and social science
The expansion of government responsibilities for ensuring the social welfare of the nation
that took place during the 1960s and 1970s led to rapid growth in administrative and
statistical records. Administrative programs required personal information, and policies and
programs required statistical data for monitoring and evaluation.
Computer technology became critical for managing governmental operations and trans-
formed the information infrastructure of government agencies. Enhancements to government
administrative record-keeping systems made possible efficiencies in large-scale data collec-
tion and processing. Computer matching became a standard administrative tool to investigate
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement (Oversight of Computer Matching, 1982). Agencies
routinely produced and distributed public use summary data tabulations and microdata files.
Computer technology became equally essential for the operations of the private sector for
efficient information management and collection of enormous quantities of personal informa-
tion. Computer technology was also instrumental in improving the capabilities of the
scientific community by providing the computational resources to link survey and admin-
istrative records and to organize, manage, retrieve, and analyze large quantities of data (David
& Robbin, 1989, 1990; Robbin, 1995; Robbin & David, 1988).8
Computer technology was, however, an indispensable but ‘‘double-edged sword.’’ While
essential for managing the work of government, the private sector, and research in the social
scientific community, the widespread use of these sophisticated data practices significantly
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contributed to public anxiety about personal privacy and ultimately eroded researchers’
access to government statistical and administrative records.
3.1. The effects of law and policy on researcher access to government records
The social research community had historically enjoyed a special relationship with
government, one that permitted researchers extraordinary access to administrative and
statistical records based on their potential contribution for solving social problems.9 By the
1960s, social science had become increasingly dependent on data from administrative
agencies’ statistical record-keeping systems, and the wide array of social program experi-
mentation and evaluation that took place as a result of Great Society initiatives depended on
access to such information (Riecken & Boruch, 1978).
The privileged access of the social research community to government information was,
however, irrevocably altered by the mid-1970s, a result of a series of court cases and federal
and state government intrusions into private lives that clarified the failure of existing laws to
protect informational privacy.10 Public anxiety about the loss of privacy, government
databanks, and computers, reinforced by congressional hearings and the media, fueled the
implementation of federal and state statutes, regulations, and administrative policies and
guidelines to safeguard privacy and create enforceable expectations of confidentiality.11
Threats to personal privacy by computer technology, government, and the private sector were
widely popularized (e.g., Flaherty, 1979, 1989; Sieghart, 1976; University of California at
Los Angeles, Law Review Research Project, 1968; Westin, 1971, 1976a, 1976b; Westin &
Baker, 1972).
The nature of public support for science and technology also changed, moving from
advocacy to questioning the nature of the research activity (Weingart, 1982; Wulff, 1979).
Government began to intervene through regulation and public policy to intrude into science’s
traditional autonomy.12
The Privacy Act of 1974 and other statutory controls on access to identifiable records were
especially effective in modifying the relationship between the social research community and
government agencies. The Privacy Protection Study Commission subsequently recognized
these potentially detrimental effects. By the latter half of the 1970s, government officials who
supported research on government records and members of the research community began to
register concern that the Privacy Act and confidentiality provisions in other statutes had
unintentionally and detrimentally affected access to data for research.
For example, Jabine (1975, p. 229), at the time a member of the Social Security
Administration, wrote that, ‘‘Over the long term, the Privacy Act [could] be expected to
reduce. . .the amount and kinds of statistical data, which the [Social Security Administra-
tion’s] Office of Research and Statistics [would] be able to provide both for internal SSA
purposes and for outside users. The data. . .will be less timely and of poorer quality.’’ Hulett
(1977, p. 207), another government official, noted that, ‘‘It [was] not unlikely that agencies
[would] take a narrow view of appropriate uses of their data, thereby unduly restricting
statistical or research activities, which serve broader public purposes.’’ Indeed, by the late
1970s, government agencies like the Social Security Administration and the Internal Revenue
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Service, which had once provided public use or restricted access files to university
researchers, terminated the production and distribution of public use files that had been
available to the research community for more than 10 years.13
The Privacy Protection Study Commission (1977) also concluded that as research and
statistical activities became more dependent on administrative records, it had become more
difficult for individuals to ‘‘control the way information about [them was] collected and
used’’ ( p. 568). The growing amount of research and statistical activities ‘‘called into
question the validity of the expectation of confidentiality.’’ Moreover, the ‘‘use of
individually identifiable research and statistical records for administrative, regulatory, or
law enforcement purposes encourage[d] abuse of the expectation that information will be
kept confidential’’ ( p. 568). The Commission recommended that a ‘‘clear boundary be
established between the use of such information and the use of information that is collected,
maintained, or disseminated for other purposes’’ and that the principle of ‘‘functional
separation’’ be adopted to ‘‘functionally separate’’ federal agency research and statistical
activities from policy and decision-making units ( p. 572). This principle would be
enunciated by government and private sector researchers and statisticians over the next
two decades and would serve as a cornerstone for recommendations governing statistical
practices and the use of administrative records (see Duncan et al., 1993, pp. 4–6, 34–35,
53–54, and 217–218).
During the development of privacy and confidentiality laws, members of the statistical
communities and governments in western Europe, Canada, and the US initiated a series of
policy reviews and analyses (American Statistical Association, 1977; Clark & Coffey, 1984;
Dalenius, 1979; Dalenius & Klevmarken, 1976; Durbin, 1979; Duncan et al., 1993; Fienberg,
Martin, & Straf, 1985; Flaherty, 1978; Hedrick, Boruch, & Ross, 1978; Hewitt, 1979; Martin
& Straf, 1992; Mochmann & Mu¨ller, 1979a, 1979b; Spruill, 1984; U.S. National Research
Council, 1979, 2000; U.S. Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards, 1978a; U.S.
Privacy Protection Study Commission, 1977; Wilson & Smith, 1984). Government and other
statisticians made significant progress in assessing statistical disclosure risk and in developing
statistical techniques and administrative procedures for controlling risk. Government inter-
agency committees published the results of these studies (U.S. Office of Federal Statistical
Policy and Standards, 1978b). Other groups and investigators examined the effects of
confidentiality/privacy statutes and administrative policies on the social research process
(Gordon & Heinz, 1979; Robbin, 1981, 1984; Sasfy & Siegel, 1981a, 1981b).
Researchers conducted controlled experiments to test methodological approaches for
assuring the confidentiality of social research data. Field experiments examined the effects
of wording of informed consent statements (Boruch, 1979; Boruch & Cecil, 1979, 1983;
Singer, 1978, 1983; U.S. National Research Council, 1979). The underlying rationale for this
research was the potential negative consequences of citizen refusal to participate in
government record-keeping activities. High participation rates in the decennial census,
government surveys and, more generally, administrative record keeping were viewed as
essential for the functioning and maintenance of the political system. Citizens supplied
information that was necessary for designing, monitoring, and evaluating public policy.
Participation in government surveys was also an indicator of support for government, more
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generally, and ‘‘full and accurate information from individuals and households’’ required that
government agencies had the respondent’s trust and cooperation (U.S. National Research
Council, 1979, p. 1).
In sum, beginning in the early 1970s, legislative initiatives and agency policies on privacy
and confidentiality played a critical role in altering the relatively easy access to government
records that social scientists had enjoyed in earlier decades. These developments stimulated
important theoretical research in statistical disclosure risk and methodological research to
improve the confidentiality of research data. All the same, social scientists did not operate in a
vacuum. Public opinion about privacy and confidentiality had played a critical role in
defining the legislative agenda, in developing statistical agencies’ policies, and in stimulating
these social scientists’ basic research activities to understand the consequences of privacy
concerns for participation in government record-keeping.
4. Privacy concerns and participation in the decennial census
Declining participation rates in the decennial census, from 78% in 1970 to 65% in 1990,
were an impetus for federal government research on privacy concerns. For example, after the
1990 decennial census, the National Opinion Research Center conducted a Survey of Census
Participation (SCP) to ascertain reasons for census nonresponse (Martin, 2000; Singer,
Mathiowetz, & Couper, 1993). Confidence in the Census Bureau’s assurances of confidenti-
ality had an effect in 1990: 86.1% with high confidence but only 73.5 with low confidence
returned their census forms (Singer et al., 1993, pp. 467–468). The researchers found that,
overall, privacy and confidentiality concerns affected mail return rates for a small but
significant percentage of citizens and that the ‘‘crucial variable appears to be trust in the
integrity of the data collection agency, not the nature of the assurance given to respondents’’
(Singer et al., 1993, p. 479).
The decennial census again became controversial in the 2 months leading up to the 2000
census. Critics deemed the long form’s questions as too intrusive and too personal. For
example, Bast (2000), CEO of the Heartland Institute, a nonprofit policy think-tank
advocating free market principles and recipient of the long form, accused the Census Bureau
of exceeding its authority and conducting an ‘‘unwarranted invasion of privacy.’’ He posted a
‘‘Census Workers Not Welcome Here. Do Not Knock’’ sign that was widely distributed.
Census Bureau Director Kenneth Prewitt showed the sign at a June 10, 2000 news briefing to
illustrate the ‘‘organized resistance’’ that the Bureau continued to face (Census, 2000a).
Public perceptions that the Bureau could not be trusted were confirmed when the national
media reported on the Census Bureau’s participation in the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II (Holmes, 2000a; Seltzer & Anderson, 2000). Although the Bureau did
not supply names and addresses of people of Japanese ancestry to the Defense Department, it
provided information about their concentrations in small geographic areas. This ‘‘news’’ was,
of course, not new, although the Bureau did not publicly acknowledge its role until 1981
(Roth, 1981). Nonetheless, the ‘‘revelation’’ occurred when the Bureau was about to field the
2000 census. It also raised fears among ethnic groups with high levels of immigration, like
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Latinos, that census data could be used to arrest illegal immigrants. It also coincided with
alleged breaches in national security by a Chinese American scientist that contributed to a
continuing hostility against the ‘‘foreign presence’’ of Asian Americans (Glanz, 2000; Kang,
2000; Norman, 2000a). To make matters worse, the national press reported that the Census
Bureau had been communicating to new employees a ‘‘false account of [its] handling of
confidential material in World War II’’ (Norman, 2000b).
Politicians of all political persuasions weighed in with press releases. From the floors of
Congress, both Republicans and Democrats intoned their opposition to government bureau-
cracy, excusing their constituents from completing the census form. Representative Nick
Smith (R-MI) complained that, ‘‘There are too many curiosity questions on the Census long
form. Right now. . .citizens are asked. . .very personal questions, very intrusive questions. . .I
think. . .the danger is a government that, out of curiosity, would like to know more than they
really need to know about our individual lives’’ (Smith, 2000, p. H1418; see also Rosenbaum,
2000). Representative James A. Traficant (D-OH) accused the Census Bureau of ‘‘literally
[being] out of control’’ and went on to say:
Check this out: Reports now say that the Census Bureau is, quote/unquote, willing to sacrifice
a true head count of American citizens for more personal detailed information. Unbelievable.
Forms with questions about your bank account, your cars, how many bathrooms you have,
your job. What is next, Congress, your sex life? The Constitution mandates a simple head
count by a Census taker, not an audit by some bureaucratic intrusive nincompoop. I yield
back the manipulations of both American citizens and our great Constitution by the Census
Bureau (Traficant, 2000, p. H1419).
Census Bureau Director Kenneth Prewitt, at news conferences, in testimony before
congressional committees, and through press releases, repeatedly explained that every
question on the census ‘‘was put there to fulfill some very serious piece of legislation or
government program’’ (Rosenbaum, 2000). The Census Bureau’s rapid response and an
explanation of the relationship of the census to intergovernmental revenue transfers to the
states clarified the effects of nonparticipation. Congressional opponents eventually issued
press releases that encouraged their constituents to complete the census. Senate Majority
leader Trent Lott (R-MS), for example, while noting the ‘‘intrusive’’ nature of census
questions, emphasized the importance of the census for ‘‘Mississippi’s future’’:
I urge that all Mississippians respond to Census 2000. Since 1790, the census has determined
the number of Congressional seats allotted to each state. Today, it also helps determine how
much of your federal tax dollars will return to your community. If Mississippi’s census
participation doesn’t improve, Mississippians will be short-changed in both areas—possibly
losing an estimated US$400 million in federal funds, and one of five Congressional
seats. . .Many Mississippians have called my office objecting to what they deem are intrusive
questions on the census ‘‘long form,’’ which about one in seven households received. If you
feel you cannot answer a question, please don’t throw the form away. Federal law requires us
to fully answer the census and ensures confidentiality. However, if you feel you cannot
answer a question, please call the main census help line at 1-800-471-9424. The census is just
too important to our fellow Mississippians to simply be discarded. . .Census 2000 is
Mississippi’s future. Please don’t leave it blank ( Lott, 2000).
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InterSurvey, a survey research firm, confirmed the political damage to the Bureau by
following a national sample of Americans as part of its research on exposure to Census 2000
advertising (Nie, Junn, & Slotwiner, 2000). InterSurvey conducted a survey with a separate
sample of nearly 2000 persons the week following negative media coverage of the ‘‘long
form’’ to determine whether the controversy over the long form had influenced participation
rates (Nie & Junn, 2000). The survey indicated that privacy concerns increased from about
10% at the beginning of March to 20% by mid-April. The researchers found that household
participation rates differed significantly between people who saw the census as an invasion of
privacy and those who did not. The controversy decreased participation: 9% were less likely
to participate, 48% less likely to answer all long form questions, and 29% less likely to
answer all short form questions (Nie et al., 2000, Slide 19). Eighty-four percent of those who
had received the long form viewed the income and physical and mental disabilities questions
as too personal (Nie et al., 2000, Slide 20). However, InterSurvey also found that exposure to
the Census 2000 promotion and mobilization effort increased participation, even for people
with privacy concerns, thus confirming that the Bureau’s mobilization through advertising
could mitigate some of the damage done through linkage of privacy issues to participation in
the decennial census.
The long form controversy also reinforced public concerns about the availability of
personal information through the Internet. As one person commented to a newspaper reporter,
‘‘There is enough information out there on every person walking this earth. . .All they have to
do is get somebody with a Pentium III and hook up to the Internet and they would get
everything they want. They do not need a census organization’’ (Norman, 2000b). The public
furor over privacy and computer security so sensitized the Census Bureau that the agency
maintained a low profile about how citizens could complete the ‘‘short form’’ online at the
census Web site (Hammer, 2000). Finally, the Bureau also could not ignore that privacy and
confidentiality concerns had interacted with the long-standing controversy over statistical
adjustment, sampling, and the accuracy of the census (Holmes, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d), the
well-publicized ‘‘screw-up,’’ as Congressman Jack Kingston (R-GA) put it, of sending out a
preliminary notice of the arrival of the census form to incorrect mailing addresses (Kingston,
2000, p. H10831; Myers, 2000), and that its funding for completing Census 2000 operations
was not yet secure (Census 2000b, 2000c).14
4.1. Census Bureau response: access to the 2000 PUMS and consequences for social
research15
From 1790 to 1950, the U.S. Bureau of the Census published decennial census tabulations
by geographic area. In 1960, in what demographer Steven Ruggles, director of the Minnesota
Population Center at the University of Minnesota, has called a ‘‘paradigm shift,’’ the Census
Bureau created and disseminated a 1-in-1000 extract of the complete enumeration, which was
released as a PUMS.16 Ruggles wrote that the 1960–1990 PUMS, along with the 1940 and
1950 1-in-100 samples produced at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, ‘‘revolutionized
the analysis of the American population,’’ led to ‘‘an explosion of census-based research,’’
and established PUMS as ‘‘the mainstay of American social science’’ (‘‘Background and
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Significance,’’ p. 1). What made the PUMS data so important, Ruggles noted, were their
‘‘broad chronological scope, large sample populations, and fine detail’’ (‘‘Background and
Significance,’’ p. 1).
Individual-level sample data from the decennial census can be released because the Bureau
deletes names, addresses, and ‘‘other potentially identifying information’’ to protect the
confidentiality of respondents. Detail on geography is limited to the areas with more than
100,000 population.17 The Bureau also applies rules to protect individual identification for
geographic location of residence and work, income, and several other variables.18 Decisions
regarding subject detail and geography were a result of significant, previously noted research
in assessing statistical disclosure risk, reidentification of respondents, and developing
confidentiality-preserving statistical methods by statisticians at the Bureau of the Census
and elsewhere (Fienberg & Willenborg, 1998; Kim &Winkler, 1997; U.S. Federal Committee
on Statistical Methodology, 1994, 1999; U.S. Office of Federal Statistical Policy and
Standards, 1978b; Winkler, 1997, 1998, 1999).
In mid-Spring 2000, reacting to congressional criticism about statistical adjustment
(Anderson & Feinberg, 1999; Skerry, 2000) and the public controversy over the long form,
the Census Bureau proposed significant reductions in the level of subject detail for the 2000
PUMS to ‘‘reassure’’ citizens about the Bureau’s commitment to preserving confidentiality.
The response by the social science community to the Bureau’s proposal was swift. The Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of
Michigan organized a ‘‘Task Force on the 2000 PUMS’’ with the goal of ‘‘proposing a
balance between data integrity and issues of confidentiality’’ (‘‘Why Is There a Task Force?’’).
On May 9, 2000, demographer Richard Ruggles, who served as chair of the ICPSR Census
2000 Advisory Committee, distributed a letter over the Internet that described the Bureau’s
plans, stated that he would be attending a Bureau-sponsored ‘‘Census 2000 Users Conference
on PUMS’’ on May 22, 2000 that was designed to ‘‘gauge the reaction of the user community
to the proposed changes’’ and requested that concerned PUMS users complete a user survey
(‘‘Appendix A. ICPSR Letter and Survey’’).
The letter received wide circulation. Professional listservs and associations served to
mobilize demographers, historians, and social scientists. More than 1000 people in the
academic and policy communities responded to the Web-based survey on the importance of
the PUMSdata (‘‘Design and Execution’’). The Task Force published the results of the survey in
a detailed report entitled, ‘‘The Public Use Microdata Samples of the U.S. Census: Research
Applications and Privacy,’’ whichwas communicated to theCensusBureau at theMaymeeting.
The Task Force’s preliminary analysis of the Bureau’s proposal indicated that the ‘‘impact
of [the proposed] Bureau plan would
 group ages into 5-year categories for persons aged 65 or older and reduce the top code
for age from 90 to 85,
 reduce the number of ancestry categories from 560 to 105,
 reduce the Hispanic origin categories from 206 to 23,
 reduce the number of identified occupational groups from 505 to 67,
 reduce the number of identified industry groups from 244 to 70,
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 reduce the number of language categories from 393 to 83, and
 eliminate 298 foreign countries of birth and substitute 14 continents and US
possessions’’ (‘‘Summary’’).
Subsequent analysis suggested even more troublesome Bureau decisions. In a June 2
listserv update to PUMS users, Task Force Chair Ruggles remarked that a number of Bureau
classifications ‘‘did not seem to make much sense,’’ appeared ‘‘to be hastily conceived with
no systematic underlying principles,’’ and had ‘‘no scientific basis’’ (Ruggles, 2000a). For
example, the Bureau proposed to ‘‘collapse very large occupational groups, such as teachers,
construction trades, and motor vehicle operators into single huge categories but to maintain
small occupational groups like librarians and archivists.’’ Certain occupations like childcare
workers ‘‘would no longer be identifiable.’’ Moreover, foreign countries of birth would not be
identified (item on ancestry). However, ‘‘in some cases, extremely small groups’’ would be
identified, such as American Indian tribes and members of US possessions. The report
identified anomalies, including recodes that ‘‘appear[ed] arbitrary and unsystematic (e.g.,
Shoshone Native Americans and persons of Albanian descent [would] be identified but not
persons of Mexican or Chinese birth)’’ (‘‘Conclusion and Recommendations’’).
The Task Force’s report was a powerful affirmation of the value of releasing government
data and how influential a tool the PUMS data files have been for the creation of new
knowledge and for public policy. It was immediately apparent that reductions in subject detail
and geography would curtail, eliminate, or significantly jeopardize important ongoing and
future research. For example, the report noted that, ‘‘concern had been expressed about
geography, income, and age variables,’’ but ‘‘approximately 90% of faculty researchers also
said that a reduction in the detail available on occupation and race would have ‘catastrophic’
or ‘very harmful’ consequences for research in their field’’ (‘‘Results’’).
The richly textured qualitative responses to questions about the effects of reductions of
PUMS subject and geography detail identified by professional demographers, social
scientists, historians, and policy analysts and the emerging generation of scholars who are
currently graduate students told a compelling story (‘‘Appendix C. Reduction of PUMS
Detail and Your Research’’). The key question in the survey that elicited an extensive
exposition of the utility of these data was ‘‘Please comment below on ways in which
reduction of PUMS detail might affect your research. Be specific as possible. For example, if
you specialize in aging research, comment on the sorts of analyses that would be precluded
by grouped age data.’’ The ‘‘Results’’ section of the Report summarized some of the principal
arenas in which current social research is carried out.
We had hundreds of responses to this inquiry. . .Many respondents focus their research on
particular population subgroups, which they might be unable to identify in a less-detailed
sample. Some examples include studies of immigrant groups within metropolitan areas, the
changing demographics of hotel and restaurants workers in San Francisco and Los Angeles,
the legal profession, and specific Asian-Pacific populations. Policy makers in particular
expressed concern about the loss of the detail needed to study issues such as school voucher
programs, welfare reform, residential segregation, urban poverty, and measures of social and
economic inequality at the local level (‘‘Survey Results’’).
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The Bureau was asked to ‘‘avoid making precipitous decisions that [would] do permanent
damage to social science research in the US’’ (‘‘Summary’’).
4.2. Seeking explanation for the Bureau’s proposal: politics and information privacy
Many respondents linked the Bureau’s proposal to a hostile political environment, public
controversy over the long form, media coverage, and privacy concerns by a worried citizenry
that were more appropriately targeted at the e-commerce private sector.19 A faculty member
commented, ‘‘This move to limit detail sounds like a knee-jerk reaction to the pseudo-fuss
last month over ‘invasive’ long form questions.’’ Another respondent wrote, ‘‘To the best of
my knowledge, 2000 is the first census year in which there has been so much media coverage
devoted to any sort of privacy concerns related to census data. If not for said media coverage,
I doubt this would even be an issue.’’ A researcher commented,
It seems that the real interest in limiting the data has little to do with confidentiality and much
to do with saving money and promoting a political agenda. The whole anti-census issue
seems a political ploy to rally public opinion against ‘big government’ by attacking a
relatively defenseless target, meanwhile limiting the ability of pesky social science
researchers to ask important and difficult questions.
The Bureau’s proposal was not an appropriate response to the public’s concerns about
privacy, respondents asserted. The concern about privacy ‘‘needs to be directed at its true
source, private sector Internet businesses, and [not] redirected at academic researchers who
would have no interest in trying to identify individuals.’’
Respondents compared the release of anonymized PUMS detail to the quantities of easily
accessible personally identifiable information that private sector firms maintain on individuals
and access to databases on the Web. One person commented that it ‘‘amazed’’ him that
‘‘people who will happily allow unknown corporations to track their Internet reading,
electronic shopping behavior, and spending patterns are worried that egg-heads like myself
will try to find out where they live.’’ Another person contended that, ‘‘There is no information
in the PUMS that I can conceive of anyone wanting for inappropriate reasons, which could
not be found more easily from credit reporting agencies and other administrative sources.’’ A
faculty member recognized ‘‘the concern’’ and was ‘‘appalled by the loss of privacy in the age
of linked computer records and the Internet.’’ However, he continued, ‘‘It seems quixotic to
worry about privacy in Census data when marketers and geodemographic companies
combine to know more and more about individuals. I worry more about my medical records
being in the hands of my employer.’’
The general assessment was that people disclosed ‘‘far more identifying information about
themselves in the course of surfing the net than they do in filling out the long form.’’
Furthermore, ‘‘unlike academic researchers, Internet companies and Web site developers are
not constrained by professional codes of ethics or institutional rules against profit mongering.’’
A graduate student wrote that, ‘‘I cannot really imagine how people would use the PUMS to
get access to information about specific people. There are so many more real threats to
privacy embedded in the proliferation of online databases accessible through the Web.’’
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Over and over again, respondents rejected the notion that it was possible to identify
individuals from the sample data. One person commented that, ‘‘Someone would have to
work very hard to reveal odd cases that stand out in the data. Given that only 1 in 20 cases
will be released, census data are a much less effective means of discovering private
information about specific individuals than recourse to privately maintained databases that
even include exact names and addresses.’’
PUMS users concluded that individual identification was not an activity that any scholar
was interested in pursuing and that ‘‘concerns about the confidentiality of PUMS data are
vastly overstated.’’ They also questioned the logic of reductions in subject detail without
empirical evidence to demonstrate that disclosure had actually occurred. One person asked
rhetorically, ‘‘Given that there has never been a breech of confidentiality privilege in the use
of PUMS, why is it necessary to make any changes?’’ Indeed, the assessment of the Task
Force was that, ‘‘In the 36-year history of the census microdata samples, no respondent has
ever been identified by anyone outside the Census Bureau. We consider such identification to
be highly improbable even under the current standards’’ (‘‘Summary’’).
Ruggles’s (2000a) June 2, 2000 update of ‘‘PUMS 2000 News’’ affirmed that the Bureau
had ‘‘legitimate concerns about congressional criticism of the long form.’’ However, he went
on to say, ‘‘Haphazard and excessive reductions in the detail available to scholars and
planners will do little or nothing to protect respondent confidentiality.’’ He pointed out that
the Bureau’s ‘‘fears about respondent disclosure’’ were based on faulty reasoning about the
outcome of linking summary and sample files, because confidentiality edits had already been
applied. He contended that the proposed ‘‘reductions in the subject area detail would not
ameliorate the risk posed by linking in the slightest, since even under the Bureau’s plan the
PUMS will still include as much subject detail as do the summary files.’’
Nonetheless, the Report acknowledged that the Bureau had legitimate concerns and that
there were political reasons for reducing the possibility of disclosure. ‘‘Privacy in America
is indeed under assault,’’ and thus the public needed to be reassured that ‘‘the risk of
disclosure is negligible’’ (‘‘Summary’’). The recommendation was to close the ‘‘gaps in the
confidentiality safety net’’ for ‘‘some census categories whose cell size was too small in the
1990 PUMS,’’ which ‘‘may pose at least a theoretical, if not a practical, risk of disclosure’’
and could be ‘‘accomplished by reducing the minimum population threshold to 10,000 or
25,000 persons for every sensitive census category.’’ While the recommendation would
mean a ‘‘radical change’’ that ‘‘would doubtless be opposed by some researchers,’’ the
Report suggested that, ‘‘it was a better solution than the one proposed by the Census
Bureau.’’ The report also recommended that the ‘‘one remaining confidentiality gap’’ be
closed by suppressing the PUMA codes in the summary files for sample persons who
appear in the PUMS.
The responses to the survey also underscored the continuing debate regarding the
balancing of the principles of personal privacy and data sharing—and the privileging of
the value of access, which would be expected from the scholarly community. One respondent
captured this point of view, which was expressed by all respondents: ‘‘Restricting access or
eliminating important information does not serve the broader purposes of collecting such
data—better understanding of social conditions and problems, information about the effect of
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public policies on social conditions, and insights into how to improve matters.’’ From Paris,
France, a researcher wrote to say that, ‘‘Please stop with confidentiality paranoia: ethics and
deontology of information is not simply a question of individual confidentiality but a balance
between individual confidentiality and sociostatistical knowledge.’’
4.3. Postscript: the Bureau responds
On November 6, 2000, Ruggles (2000b) wrote to the PUMS listserv that, ‘‘I am happy to
report success in our efforts to preserve needed detail in the 2000 PUMS. . .The Census
Bureau took our concerns seriously [and] adopted all the principal recommendations of the
Task Force.’’
The Bureau of the Census issued its ‘‘Recommendations Concerning the Census 2000
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) Files’’ in October 2000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
2000). The Bureau affirmed that its proposal to modify the 2000 PUMS was directly related
to privacy concerns. It contended that ‘‘rapid advances’’ in computer technology had made it
‘‘more difficult. . .to protect the confidentiality of microdata through disclosure limitation
techniques,’’ and, as such, it had been necessary to ‘‘strengthen the confidentiality protection
that we provide for microdata files’’ ( p. 1). The Bureau identified threats related to the
computer as ‘‘more powerful computers, greater data storage capacity, increased access to the
Internet, and advances in data linking and data mining’’ ( p. 1). Privacy concerns had to be
balanced with the needs of users, and we listened, wrote the Bureau.
As such, the Bureau’s recommendation called for issuing two sets of PUMS files: 5% state
files and a 1% national characteristics file. The ‘‘possibility of disclosure problems’’ had
already led them to implement data swapping and top-coding methods.20 State-level files
would contain information for ‘‘most metropolitan areas (i.e., 231/276 or 84%) and the more
populous counties and central cities’’ with a minimum threshold population of 100,000, and
variables would be collapsed ‘‘to the level deemed necessary to maintain confidentiality while
retaining the current threshold’’ ( p. 1). The Bureau acknowledged that this threshold was the
minimum necessary for ‘‘studies by public agencies, academic researchers, and the private
sector’’ and acknowledged that to increase the threshold to 250,000 would reduce to 50% the
number of metropolitan areas ‘‘that could be recognized’’ ( p. 2).
The objective of the national characteristics file was to ‘‘achieve as much as possible the
amount of detail that was provided in the 1980 and 1990 PUMS files’’ ( p. 3). The PUMA
would have a minimum population threshold of 400,000. The Bureau was committed to
minimizing the number of variables that would be collapsed in order to ‘‘maximize the
amount of social, economic, and housing information available’’ ( p. 3). As such, there were
no plans to establish a minimum population threshold on variables.
Limits would be established on the detail of certain variables.
 Dollar amounts would be rounded and applied to all income types’ dollar amounts,
utility costs, mortgage costs, rent, condominium costs, and mobile home fees.
 All categories of race and Hispanic origin would appear on the 1% file. However, only
categories with at least 10,000 population would appear on the 5% files.
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 State- and national-level files would contain single-age categories 0–89 and be top-
coded at 90. Large households, defined as 10 or more persons, would be masked in the
state-level files. However, large households would receive a state identifier but not a
PUMA identifier.
 Travel time would be treated as a continuous variable with top-coding but no other
collapsing or rounding, but departure time would be rounded ( p. 5).
 Year of entry would be bottom-coded in direct relation to the top-coding for age ( p. 5).
A minimum population threshold of 10,000 within categorical variables would be
maintained to permit identification of groups. Rather than predetermining which variables
or how to collapse the categories, the Bureau would evaluate the records and ‘‘user input’’
would be sought ‘‘to find the most meaningful combinations of variable categories’’ ( p. 2).
Thus, what marked a significant change from past Bureau decision-making was that the
user community would be consulted about how public use data files would be released.
Their advice would be sought on the types of analyses to be carried out and the criteria to
be used ‘‘to collapse categories that did not meet the 10,000 threshold in the state-level
files’’ ( p. 6).21
The Bureau would not, however, issue any national metro files for populations of 100,000
or more, similar to what was issued in 1990. The possible combinations of national, state, and
metro public use files either did not satisfy the Disclosure Review Board’s limitation on total
sample density of no more than 6% or were unsatisfactory to users because the sample
density was insufficient or the detail was reduced.
In sum, the Bureau’s efforts were designed to protect the twin principles to which it has
traditionally been committed. The PUMS files would ensure the confidentiality of records and
provide data for scientific discovery and informed public policy.
5. No place to hide any more
The debate about the release of microdata public use files took place in an environment
where tensions between privacy and access have grown markedly over the last three decades.
The controversy over the 2000 census long form, deemed intrusive by some members of
Congress and many citizens, coupled with widespread knowledge that private sector firms
and government agencies collect, use, and sell personal information, heightened public
concerns about information privacy and led to growing support for improved statutory
protection of individually identifiable government and private sector information.
Personal information became a lucrative commodity for government and the private
sector (Allen, 2000; Bunn, 2000; Chandrasekaran, 1998; Clausing, 2000b, 2000c; CNET
News.com, 2000; Peterson, 1997; U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2000; Weinstein, 1997,
1999). Government agencies and private sector firms carry out Web site surveillance to
monitor usage, and private sector firms collect and use personal information of visitors to
their site for other purposes (Clausing, 2000d; Keizer, 1997). State and local governments
and e-commerce companies sell personal information, often without the customer’s
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permission (Bernstein, 1997a; Clausing, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e; 2000f; Kang, 1998; Keizer,
1997; O’Harrow, 1998; U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 1998). Much of what takes place,
whether its collection, sale, or manipulation, is unknown to the consumer (Treese, 2000).
‘‘People are losing control over their own identities,’’ said Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
(Bernstein, 1997b).
Threats to personal privacy seem unending, as witnessed by a recent report that the caches
of Web browsers create a threat that ‘‘allows nosey unscrupulous Web site operators to spy on
their visitors’ browsing habits’’ (Austen, 2000). Geographic tracking systems trace Internet
addresses and are used to locate target audiences for Web sites and advertisers (Olse, 2000).
Advances in wireless technology provide an opportunity for businesses to monitor their
employees and consumers (Savage & Stirpe, 2000). E-commerce firms are developing
systems to ‘‘vastly improve their ability to share names, identification numbers, and a wealth
of behavioral data about individual consumers’’ (O’Harrow, 2000). There is no place to hide
(Johnston, 2000; Koppell, 2000; Privacy Foundation, 2001). Along with these developments
have also come well-publicized technology failures. Breaches in the security of, as well as
recent attacks on, business, university, and government e-mail systems, medical and health
databases, and Web sites, have intensified fears (Lohr, 1997; Markoff, 2000; Naylor & Upton,
1999; Okie, 2000; Omega World Travel, 2000; Rubin, 2000; Schneier, 1999; Seminario,
1998; Upton, 1999).
Institutional policies and practices have altered the relationship between government
and citizen, between government and the marketplace, and between the individual and the
marketplace. The array of organizations that ‘‘claim a stake in’’ confidentiality and data
access issues has increased (Duncan et al., 1993, p. 54). Only witness the latest threat to
Title 13 that undergirds the confidentiality assurances made by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. In late 2000, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), with support from
congressional Republicans, requested access to census bureau files to create a linked data
set using information from Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration and
Census Bureau surveys that would ‘‘help CBO evaluate proposed reforms in Medicare and
Social Security’’ (Monk, 2000). The spokesman for Representative Dan Miller who
chaired the House subcommittee on the census ‘‘saw no problem with congressional
access to census data’’ because ‘‘the Census Bureau is the government and Congress is
the government.’’
Personal information has become mediated by a private sector that operates under different
legal mandates from government agencies. Private organizations increasingly assume
responsibility for data collection and dissemination. In the process of ‘‘reinventing govern-
ment,’’ government agencies have outsourced responsibilities for program implementation,
including program eligibility determination, billing, check cutting, quality control, and client
auditing and accountability. Computerized information systems, formerly the responsibility of
government agencies, are now operated by data brokers.
There is no consistent set of statutes or regulations for administrative or statistical records
that governs all federal agencies or provides guarantees of confidentiality, either for
government or for the private firms that now administer government programs. Statutory
protection is weak or nonexistent for the private sector.
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5.1. Congressional responses
As public concern mounted, a number of hearings were held during the first session of the
106th Congress on protecting consumer information maintained by financial institutions,
protecting the confidentiality of medical records, and protecting privacy in the conduct of
research in genetics and medical research more generally (Financial Privacy, 1999; Genetics
Testing in the New Millennium, 1999; Medical Information Protection and Research
Enhancement Act of 1999, 1999; Medical Records Confidentiality in a Changing Health
Care Environment, 1999; Medical Records Confidentiality in the Modern Delivery of Health
Care, 1999; Medical Records Privacy, 1999; Privacy Under a Microscope, 1999). Congress-
men spoke from the floors of Congress about the loss of personal privacy, condemning
‘‘today’s information society’’ (Hutchinson, 2000, p. H1288). However, only two major
pieces of privacy legislation were enacted. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998 (P.L. 105-277; 15 USCS x6501) required Web sites to obtain parental permission
before personal information could be requested from children under 16 years (Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Rule, 1999; Clausing, 2000e, 2000f ). More likely of greater
consequence for consumers was the enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999 (Pub. Law No. 106-102; 13 Stat 1338) governing how financial institutions could
collect and share online financial information about their clients; its minimalist approach to
regulation met with industry approval (it was deemed ‘‘reasonable’’) (McCullagh & More-
head, 2000).
Bills containing some sort of provision for enforcing online or electronic confidentiality
and protecting the privacy of personal information, including customer and medical
information privacy, were again submitted during the 106th Congress.22 Once again,
privacy-related bills languished in committee and died at the end of the second session,
attesting to the lack of success that privacy advocates had in persuading Congress to support
legislation that provided statutory protection against misuse of personal information by the
private sector, to protect the privacy of electronically stored medical records, or to monitor
e-commerce firms’ privacy protections (Clausing, 2000b, Richtel, 2000; Weinstein, 2000).
5.2. Executive branch responses
Executive branch initiatives have been a response to Congress’s abrogation of respons-
ibility for enacting legal safeguards for personal privacy. Even so, government agencies have
been slow to act, responding as Congress did, to pressure from the powerful lobbying efforts
of the private sector.
As late as 1999, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), argued that ‘‘voluntary industry
practices were working just fine’’ and that ‘‘no legislative action [was] necessary at this
time’’ (Caruso, 1999; Frishberg, 2000; Okie, 2000). The agency’s recommendation that the
private sector voluntarily enforce itself did, nonetheless, carry the threat of future agency
action to protect consumer privacy if changes were not forthcoming (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1999). Eight months later, seeing no progress by industry, the FTC again
warned the business and advertising industry ‘‘to deal promptly with privacy concerns or
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face more legislation,’’ leading one member of the Internet Advertising Bureau to attribute
the FTC’s ‘‘turn-around’’ and the response of other executive agencies and Congress to the
‘‘politics of an election year’’ (McCullagh & Morehead, 2000). Still, the industry acknowl-
edged, the financial problems and bankruptcies of e-commerce companies like DoubleClick
and Toysmart had fueled the information privacy issue with their plans to sell valuable
assets, their customer information, to raise money (Stellin, 2000).
The FTC was, however, very serious. In May 2000, after extensive research to determine
the extent of personal information held by business and the lack of consumer privacy
protections, the FTC recommended legislation that would ‘‘establish basic standards of
practice for the collection of information online and provide an implementing agency with the
authority to promulgate more detailed standards pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act’’ (Pitofsky, 2000; U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2000). Four months later, the FTC
reported the results of a September 2000 review of three US seal programs and ‘‘gave none a
passing grade’’ (Sanders, 2000).
The private sector’s opposition to consumer and employee privacy protection in the US
also extended to the comprehensive data protection laws and directives adopted by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council of Europe and
Canada, and fair information practices law that is being developed in eastern Europe and
Latin America (on international developments, see Pritchard, 2000; Rodger, 2000; The
European Commission, 1997). The stakes in these activities are very high for the US because
these data protection laws forbid the transfer of personal information to countries without
similar protections. Congress’s inability to enact similar legislation led the U.S. Department
of Commerce to develop a ‘‘safe harbor’’ framework to bridge the significant policy
differences between the US and Europe. This framework was finally approved by the
European Union in July 2000 after 2 years of negotiations (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2000). Companies will be subject to a European Data Protection Commission’s ‘‘finding of
adequacy’’ and ‘‘other benefits’’ that will flow from a safe harbor seal of approval. The
Standard, a now-defunct Internet wire service, commented that, ‘‘Short of negotiating directly
with European authorities or physically processing relevant information only within EU
borders, American companies will have no choice but to subscribe to the safe harbor, lest they
risk losing remote access to European customers, employees, or business partners’’ (The
Industry Standard, 2000).
Congress’ refusal to pass medical privacy legislation led the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), exercising its authority under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191), to develop regulations that would establish
uniform federal privacy protections for personal health information (Markoff, 1998; Pear,
2000a; Standards for Privacy, 2000; U.S. Office of the President, 2000). When the final rules
were published in December 2000, they were immediately challenged by the healthcare
industry (Pear, 2000b) but were ultimately supported by the Bush Administration.
All the same, public concerns about privacy had already resonated throughout HHS and
had had consequences for the release of microdata files. The language of the Act had been
interpreted by some HHS agency staff not to permit the release of public use microdata files,
and work that had begun ceased shortly after its enactment (Robbin & Koball, in press). Thus,
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it is expected that executive branch decisions will have far-reaching consequences for public
policy as it relates to the release of government records for social science research.
6. Conclusion
Privacy was recently named an ‘‘emerging hidden issue’’ that is ‘‘ready to explode onto
the American electorate,’’ one that ‘‘tests off the charts,’’ according to pollsters (Berke,
2000). Public opinion polls that span more than 30 years make clear, however, that privacy
is an issue that citizens have reflected on for a very long time. What they are now
experiencing is the sense that personal privacy has been eroded by the computer. There is a
widely held sense that the digital environment has transformed daily life, and this
transformation has compromised individual autonomy (Lewis, 2000). The more than three
decades of congressional hearings are symbolic affirmations of this public concern about
privacy and confidentiality.
The public’s anxiety is legitimate, as was the Bureau’s contention that it was ‘‘much more
difficult to protect the confidentiality of microdata through disclosure limitation techniques’’
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000, p. 1). Advances in computer and communications
technology have reduced substantially the cost of gathering, processing, and retrieving data
and it is relatively inexpensive to develop, maintain, and transfer very large databases
containing extensive amounts of individually identifiable and sensitive information. Soft-
ware routinely monitors Web employee work habits, tracks Web site usage, links
information about individuals from heterogeneous databases, and extracts useful information
from databases (the ‘‘data mining’’ described in the Bureau’s report) (Harmon, 1997;
Mosquiera, 2000a).
Nonetheless, congressional inaction, private sector opposition to government intervention,
and public opinion that both supports government protection of personal privacy and rejects
government regulation of private sector’s handling of personal information reflect a society
with an inability to resolve conflicting and contradictory goals, as one journalist commented
(Bernstein, 1997b). It is a ‘‘paradox,’’ wrote another journalist, commenting on the results of
the Westin survey of ‘‘Public Records and the Responsible Use of Information’’ (Mosquiera,
2000b). Americans are committed to the principle of individual autonomy that supports
information privacy. Yet, Americans are equally committed to computerized access to
personal information for what it offers in terms of domestic and international security,
management, and wealth that an information economy has brought. We should not have high
expectations for comprehensive information privacy safeguards, even if privacy legislation is
enacted during the 107th Congress (Akin, 2000; Marsan, 2000; McGuire, 2000b, 2000c).
That little headway has been made in regulating the use of personal information by the
private sector should also be understood as Congress’s faithful rendition of deeply held
beliefs by the citizenry: Government more than the private sector requires regulation. Public
concern over information privacy is intertwined with the generalized mistrust of political and
other institutions that, ironically, advantage powerful private interests at the expense of
citizens’ personal privacy.
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This regulatory impulse, translated into low levels of trust in government and declining
participation or completion rates in the decennial census, is motivation enough for govern-
ment agencies to view the external environment as hostile and to respond by protecting
themselves, to reduce scholarly access to data, and to go so far as to terminate the production
of public use files. Thus, while government statisticians and policy analysts support the
principle of data sharing, their political world is replete with contrary claims, and everything
is, as Alexis De Tocqueville observed more than two centuries ago, ‘‘agitated, disputed, and
uncertain’’ (Barber, 1988, p. 19). Under conditions of uncertainty and conflict, what ensures
the functioning of the administrative system will be privileged. Politics will almost always
trump science.
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Notes
1. See Westin (1976a, p. 6) for definitions of ‘‘privacy’’ and ‘‘confidentiality.’’ Privacy concerns ‘‘the
question of what personal information should be collected or stored at all for a given social function. It involves
issues as to the legitimacy and legality of organizational demands for disclosure from individuals and groups and
the setting of balances between the individual’s control over the disclosure of personal information and the needs
of society for the data on which to base decisions about individual situations and to formulate public policy.’’
Confidentiality concerns ‘‘the question of how personal data collected for approved social purposes shall be held
and used by the organization that originally collected it, what other secondary or further uses may be made of it,
and when consent by the individual will be required for such uses.’’ Boruch and Cecil (1979, p. 25) add that, ‘‘An
individual’s response. . .is regarded as confidential with respect to others if the information coupled with identifiers
will not or cannot be disclosed. . .to anyone else. Information or a physical record containing information is said to
be identifiable if it includes names or addresses or other forms of unique identification.’’ Duncan, Jabine, and de
Wolf (1993, pp. 22–23) differentiate ‘‘informational privacy’’ from ‘‘data protection.’’ Information privacy
‘‘encompasses an individual’s freedom from excessive intrusion in the quest for information and an individual’s
ability to choose the extent and circumstances under which his or her beliefs, behaviors, opinions, and attitudes
will be shared or withheld from others.’’ Data protection is applied to the policies and procedures that are
developed to ‘‘ensure minimal intrusion by data collection and maintenance of data confidentiality. . .Unlike
privacy, however, which is an individual right, confidentiality is not restricted to data on individuals and is often
extended to data on organizations.’’
2. In January 1990 (Harris Poll #892049), Louis Harris and Associates asked a national sample if they agreed
or disagreed with the following statement (Q.J2): ‘‘If we rewrote the Declaration of Independence today, we would
probably add ‘privacy’ to the list of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ as a fundamental right. Do you
agree or disagree with the following statement?’’ Agreement: 78.30%, Disagreement: 19.50%.
3. Louis Harris’ data reported here are available from the Institute for Research in Social Science, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill at http://www.irss.unc.edu/data_archiv/pollsearch.html. Searches were conducted
for the period 1960–2000 using the terms ‘‘privacy’’ and ‘‘privacy and consumer,’’ and tabular summaries were
constructed from the individual question responses. Unless otherwise noted, these surveys are national probability
samples of adults 18 or 21 years and older, with sample sizes of around 1500. It is important to note changes in
A. Robbin / Journal of Government Information 28 (2001) 493–527 517
question wording, because they may have had significant effects on how Americans registered their concerns
about personal privacy. The ‘‘(#xxxx)’’ in the body of the text refers to the Harris identification number assigned
to the survey.
4. Other surveys for this period include Harris Poll #7680 (January 1976), #2521 (February 1976), and #7687
(September 1976).
5. Between 1982 and 1992, the General Social Survey asked a question with the same wording of a national
sample and found that 44.6% were very concerned (n= 1506). However, a subsample (n = 354) asked the same
question in 1982 registered a far higher level of very great concern (69%) for a question with precisely the same
wording as the Harris polls. See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS99/codebook/privacy.htm.
6. For national security matters, see also Smith (1990).
7. The question on databanks was one in a series of questions on the role of government. ‘‘The federal
government has a lot of different pieces of information about people, which computers can bring together very
quickly. Is this a very serious threat to individual privacy, a fairly serious threat, not a serious threat, or not a threat
at all to individual privacy?’’ See National Opinion Research Center (1996).
8. Computer matching operations were also employed by the research community to link records from
different systems. Seminal research by government agencies began in the early 1970s, with contributions from
members of the Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and Bureau of the Census. Papers that
serve as handbooks on modern record matching theory and applications were published during the 1970s and
1980s (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 1985; U.S. Social Security Administration, 1973).
9. For a history of the relationship between the academy and government, see Duncan and Shelton (1978)
and Lyons (1969). For justification of the utility of social science in social problem-solving, see Federal
Government Statistics and Statistical Policy (1982), McAdams, Smelser, and Treiman (1982), U.S. National
Science Board (1969), and Weiss (1977a, 1977b).
10. Social research was itself also a target. During the early 1970s, law enforcement officials attempted to
obtain the names and addresses of research participants in the ‘‘Negative Income Tax’’ experiments. See U.S.
National Research Council (1975).
11. Congressional hearings on computer technology and privacy began in the 1960s and continued over the
next decades. Early hearings include Federal Data Banks and Constitutional Rights (1974), Oversight of Computer
Matching (1982), Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974 (1983), Privacy of Medical Records (1979), Public
Reaction to Privacy Issues (1979), The Computer and Invasion of Privacy (1966); and U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (1973).
12. Statutes identified conditions for access, types of use, and penalties for disclosure for administrative and
statistical records. Confidentiality provisions in federal and state statutes were, however, vague, contradictory, and
ambiguous concerning the nature of access for research or other purposes. Statutes generally prohibited the release
of identifiable information without the written consent of the individual (e.g., Public Health Services Act, Drug
Abuse and Treatment Act of 1972, and almost every state confidentiality statute). Other federal and state statutes
normally permitted disclosure without consent to those with a [the statutory language generally employed]:
‘‘legitimate interest, some of whom may be researchers or may represent research interests’’ (e.g., Federal
Education Rights Act and Privacy Act, state education, social services, health, and mental health statutes).
Disclosure could be permitted for ‘‘authorized persons engaged in research on [mental health],’’ for ‘‘audit and
evaluation. . .specifically authorized by law,’’ or for ‘‘bona fide’’ research, leaving the agency to determine
whether the ‘‘project constituted ‘bona fide’ research within the scope of the regulations’’ (Boruch & Cecil, 1979,
p. 12). Researchers inside an agency would normally have no difficulty in accessing records, and researchers hired
by an agency (or deputized for a limited period) would, in principle, have the same access to individually
identifiable records as members of an agency. For a summary of state level statutes that were developed during the
1970s, see Robbin and Jozefacki (1982).
13. For example, access was terminated to the ‘‘Continuous Work History’’ and ‘‘Longitudinal Retirement
History.’’ These data files distributed by the Social Security Administration and Health Care Financing
Administration, respectively, were two very important series of data files relied on by economists and others.
The author recalls that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 was relied on by government agencies to justify their refusal to
provide access to these data files by the social research community.
A. Robbin / Journal of Government Information 28 (2001) 493–527518
14. It was not until the end of June 2000 that the House of Representatives gave final approval to a bill (H.R.
4690) that would fully fund the remaining operations, and until the end of July 2000, the bill went to a conference
committee to resolve differences in funding levels between the House and Senate.
15. This part of the article is based on the report issued by the University of Minnesota Population Center and
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Census 2000 Advisory Committee (2000).
References are made to various sections of this report (e.g., ‘‘Background and significance’’). Demographer
Steven Ruggles played a central role in mobilizing the social science community, although the corporate entry of
the Report is for a committee he chaired, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR) Census 2000 Committee. As Director of the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota,
which provides access to an integrated PUMS series (IPUMS), Ruggles was invited to the May 22, 2000 meeting
held by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For the announcement of the formation of the Task Force and other
materials circulated by listserv, see listserv keep_informed@hist.umn.edu.
16. The 1960 PUMS was re-released in 1970 as a 1-in-100 sample. For a description of the early PUMS, see
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1964, 1972, 1973, 1984).
17. The exceptions are the 1960 and 1970 PUMS, whose population is limited to greater than 250,000.
18. On the effects of applying the requirements of confidentiality in Title 13 of the US Code, see U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1993a). The wording for the definition of ‘‘income’’ indicates that the Bureau applied a confi-
dentiality rule to limit disclosure: ‘‘In the 1990 census, income amounts less than US$999,999 were keyed in
dollars. Amounts of US$999,999 or more were treated as US$999,999 and losses of US$9999 or more were treated
as minus US$9999 in all of the computer derivations of aggregate income’’ (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993b).
19. Excerpts of comments are drawn from the Report’s Appendices C–E. A large number of the survey
respondents are identified by name, status, and institutional affiliation, but this article does not identify them.
20. ‘‘Data swapping’’ is a method of editing the source data or exchanging records for a sample of cases.
‘‘Top-coding’’ sets disclosure limitation on all cases that are ‘‘in or above a certain percentage of the distribution
into a single category’’ (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000, p. 1, footnote 1).
21. This will particularly affect the race, ethnic group, and ancestry items.
22. These included the Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 1999 (H.R. 3321), Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1999 (S. 809), Online Privacy Protection Act of 2000 (H.R. 3560), the Consumer Internet
Privacy Enhancement Act (S. 2928), Medical Financial Privacy Protection Act (H.R. 4585), Medical
Information Privacy and Security Act (S. 573, H.R. 1057), and Medical Privacy in the Age of New Technologies
Act of 1999 (H.R. 2878).
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